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Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Sir Hans Wolfgang Singer 
(born 29 November 1910 in Wuppertal; deceased 26 February 2006 in Brighton), 
 
a renowned international economist and one of the most influential development 
practitioner of the 20th century has studied in Bonn and graduated from the Economics 
Department of the University of Bonn in 1932. Being Jewish, he fled the Nazi terror in 
1933 and settled in the UK. 
After World War II, in 1947, he became an influential development scholar with the 
United Nations (UN) for two decades. During his time at the UN Hans Singer was a 
significant driver of establishing important organizations like UNICEF, UNDP and the 
World Food Programme. The main scientific finding of Hans Singer is the Singer-
Prebisch Thesis, which states that the terms of trade for commodity exporting developing 
countries tend to deteriorate over time. From 1969 until his death he joined the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex. 
In commemoration and in honour of Sir Hans Singer the German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) with support from the Institute for Political Science and Sociology of the University 
of Bonn established the “Hans Singer Memorial Lecture on Global Development” which 
took place for the first time on 18 May 2009. It is foreseen that the Memorial Lecture will 





















The Hans Singer Memorial Lecture: Bonn to honour one of the 
20th century’s outstanding development researchers 
Dr. Thomas Fues 1 
 
 
Hans Singer – A pioneer of development research 
Prof. Dr. Dirk Messner 3 
 
 
Hans Singer – the gentle giant 
Prof. Sir Richard Jolly 7 
 
 
Hans Singer's Legacy: The problem of commodity exporters revisited 
Prof. Dr. Paul Collier 9 
 
 
Revitalizing the United Nations: Five proposals 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Prof. Dr. Sir Hans W. Singer 17 
(Originally published in October 1995) 
 
 
The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 25 
 
 













Hans Singer Memorial Lecture 2009 
 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 1
The Hans Singer Memorial Lecture: Bonn to honour one of the 20th century’s 
outstanding development researchers1 
Dr. Thomas Fues 
On 18 May 2009 the first “Hans Singer Memorial Lecture on Global Development” took 
place in Bonn. The Memorial Lecture, a joint initiative of the German Development 
Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and the Institute of 
Development Studies (University of Sussex) with support from the Institute for Political 
Science and Sociology of the University of Bonn was created to honour one of the 
twentieth century’s most influential European development researchers, whose academic 
career began at the University of Bonn. It was in Bonn that he was to acquire his first 
academic degree, in economics, in 1931. He had already gained the support of Joseph 
Schumpeter, at that time a professor of political economics in Bonn, for his planned 
doctoral studies. However, Schumpeter, who was later to achieve eminence in his field, 
soon left Bonn for a position at Harvard University. Singer was in the midst of writing a 
new dissertation when he was forced to flee the National Socialist terror regime because of 
his Jewish background. In 1934 he arrived, by a roundabout way, in the UK, where he was 
soon to become a member of the group of Cambridge scholars around John Maynard 
Keynes.  
Since World War II, Sir Hans Singer – he was knighted by Queen Elizabeth in 1994 – 
shaped, in key ways, both the academic debate on the countries of the South and the 
practice of development policy. From 1947 to 1969, Hans Singer held a number of 
prominent posts in the United Nations’ development sector. From 1969 to 2006, the year 
of his death, he was a member of the teaching and research staff of the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) in Brighton. Hans Singer devoted the better part of his life to 
efforts to give the economic sciences a new, emphatically moral orientation geared to 
practical applications and advisory work. That may be the reason why he has, until today, 
received relatively little recognition in his own discipline, that is, outside the field of 
development studies.  
It was at the United Nations that Hans Singer developed his widely acclaimed theory on 
the long-term deterioration in the terms of international trade for developing countries 
specialised in the export of primary products, the so-called Prebisch-Singer Thesis, a 
hypothesis that has since become a core element of international economics. According to 
the Prebisch-Singer Thesis, integration into the world economy on the basis of exports of 
agricultural and mineral commodities works to the detriment of this group of countries, 
while at the same time the industrialised countries stand to benefit, disproportionately and 
systematically, from international trade. Hans Singer identifies the root structural cause of 
this interdependency, with its alarming implications for development policy, in 
institutional disparities in the labour markets of developing and industrialised nations. In 
connection with a mission to Kenya in the early 1970s that he headed, together with the 
                                                 
1 “The Hans Singer Memorial Lecture: Bonn to honour one of the 20th century’s outstanding 
development researchers” was first published as “The Current Column” on 11 May 2009. 
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renowned development scientist Sir Richard Jolly (IDS), on behalf of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), Hans Singer also published some pioneering findings with 
immediate relevance for development practice. Together, the two development researchers 
developed the innovative idea of redistribution with growth, a concept that involved a 
reassessment and acknowledgement of the informal productive sector. 
Alongside the theoretical impulses he provided for development research, Hans Singer 
published a number of key conceptual contributions bearing on the development and 
qualification of international institutions, most of them part the United Nations system, 
including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme 
(WFP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the UN Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). 
The prodigious list of Hans Singer’s publications bears witness to an extraordinary 
creative power and at the same time serves to document the breadth of the interests that 
accompanied him in the course of his scholarly career, encompassing a period of over 70 
years. He held his last lecture, on the origin of the 0.7 percent goal set for development 
policy, one week before his ninety-fifths birthday. It was no doubt his own biography that 
induced Hans Singer to work unceasingly for social justice, human development, and 
poverty alleviation, which he saw as the central concerns of scholarship and politics. He 
furthermore trusted in the ability of international institutions, and the United Nations in 
particular, to create and sustain peace.  
Hans Singer received broad international recognition and was honoured on numerous 
occasions; a total of five commemorative publications were dedicated to him in his 
lifetime. In Germany, the University of Freiburg awarded him an honorary doctorate in 
2004. 
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Hans Singer – A pioneer of development research 
Prof. Dr. Dirk Messner 
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Colleagues, dear Friends, 
It is an honour for me to welcome you all in the name of the three Institutions here and in 
the name of our Institute, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). And it is an honour for me to present some introductory 
remarks on behalf of our colleagues focussing on the work of Sir Hans Singer and 
focussing on the relevance of Hans Singer for all of us as individuals, as scientists, as 
researchers and as political practitioners.  
I would like to make four brief points.  
My first point is that I would like to especially welcome the daughter-in-law of Hans 
Singer. She is here this evening as well as the grandchildren of Hans Singer. Thank you 
very much that you accepted our invitation; it is an honour and a privilege for us to have 
you all here. And you should feel in this room that for all of us Hans Singer was a very 
important person, a very special personality. For many of us he was important as an 
intellectual, as a great thinker, as one of the most important development researchers of 
our times. And he has written so many important papers, that all of us have cited so often. 
So he was very important as a researcher and as an intellectual. And for many of us he was 
very important as a teacher, too. I remember my times at the university studying 
economics and political science. And in all our textbooks it was reported always to be able 
to cite Hans Singer, so he is very important for many of us in this room as a teacher, too.  
And for some of us, for some privileged like Richard Jolly, he was not only a major 
researcher, an important person, a very important author of very important papers; he was 
a colleague and a friend. From the perspective of the citizens of Bonn, it is also a privilege 
for us and we should honour that Hans Singer, Sir Hans as we have called him, has been 
working, studying and influencing our thinking here in Bonn at this University. We are 
proud that he has been studying in Bonn.  
We all know that he had to leave in 1933 as a political refugee and his entire family had to 
flee from Germany as a result of German fascism. We all know that and we feel very 
honoured that you are here today, this evening to celebrate Hans Singer with us. So again 
thank very much for that. 
My second point is that I need to thank another person and that is Sir Richard Jolly. 
Richard Jolly is actually another hero of development research, as we all know. Richard 
Jolly is one of the most influential thinkers in development research, development theories 
and practical international development co-operation of the last decades. And thank you 
for that, for your activities and I praise you for the idea to bring together the Institute of 
Development Studies, the University of Bonn and the German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik to organise this first Hans Singer Memorial 
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Lecture on Global Development. And hopefully we will be meeting again next year in 
Brighton for the second Lecture followed by the third Lecture back in Bonn. So, we are 
really building bridges between the University of Sussex and its Institute of Development 
Studies, our Institute and the University of Bonn, reflecting on the legacy of Hans Singer’s 
work. So, Richard, thank you very much, that was a brilliant idea! We had those 
discussions only one year ago at the beginning of June 2008, during the Annual ACUNS 
Meeting where we discussed the development policies and strategies of the United 
Nations. And these issues are obviously very strongly  linked with Hans Singers work and 
I know that Prof. Dr. Uwe Holtz, from the Institute of Political Science and Sociology of 
the University of Bonn, who is here this evening, was one of the persons from the 
University of Bonn who pushed this initiative forward. Prof. Holtz, thank you very much 
for your help and engagement. 
The third point that I would like to make is, that I had actually the chance to meet Hans 
Singer twice. I met him in 1996 and 1997. He was 85 years old and I was 35, or so. A half 
century between us. It was not only that I had the chance to see him and to talk to him. No, 
I even had the pleasure to have an office at IDS next door to Hans Singer. Can you 
imagine what incredible luck for me? I had been working at the Institute of Development 
Studies as a guest researcher and next door to my office I had one of the biggest thinkers 
in development research of our times and I had the chance to talk to him on a daily basis. 
You can imagine that? And what I would like to emphasise is that Hans Singer was very 
modest, although he was so famous, so important, so influential, so widely cited. He was 
very modest, very humorous; humour was very characteristic for him. He was very open 
minded, innocent--that was a point you mentioned also, Richard. He was someone who 
had written so many books, so many articles, developed so many concepts, but he always 
listened. He was not someone who told the rest of the world how the road moves forward, 
he had the capacity to listen and to learn by listening. I think that was a very important 
characteristic of Hans Singer. And he was very straightforward in his thinking. 85 years 
old when I met him in 1996 and 1997. He was there every day for two hours writing 
articles that were published the next day in the Herald Tribune, The Times etc. Productive 
and very influential at age 85--I was very impressed because he was not only an excellent 
intellectual, from his personality he was also a very impressive human being. That was 
what I wanted to emphasise. It was a great pleasure for me to have had the chance to meet 
him. 
I should develop two points that he mentioned very often in 1996 and 1997 when we met. 
I heard two important messages from Sir Hans. The first one: He told us that in 
development research we are talking too much about policy and too little about polity and 
politics. Too much about policy, we are doing this and this programme, and too little 
about politics: that’s about power, political processes and polity, that’s about institutions – 
today we call it governance, governance issues. This was among the most important 
messages for us younger researchers. The next one in 1996, 1997: he was very much 
focussing on his articles for the Herald Tribune and The Times how to bring together 
global development trends with local development issues very much on the ground. 
Global development trends like migration, urbanisation and global environmental 
challenges and financial markets. He wrote a set of papers on the instability of financial 
markets. And he tried to understand what this meant for local development and children 
and poverty and health systems and how to bring these local-global interdependencies 
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together. For me, this was one of his legacies. Reflecting on the bridges between the local 
processes and global trends and how to translate that in policies that work in very 
concrete, real contexts, in specific countries. Hans Singer was interested not only in 
theories, in concepts, in numbers – but also in real changes in the real world. That was an 
important message to us. This was my third point – this was about Hans Singer and my 
great chance to talk to him. 
My last point is about our guest lecturer Prof. Dr. Paul Collier. While we are talking about 
Hans Singer, one of the most important development researchers of the last century, we 
are privileged to welcome another hero of development research. Paul Collier is one of the 
most important, influential and brilliant development researchers and economists of our 
time. Welcome Paul, I am very happy that you are here this evening and that you accepted 
our invitation. Most of you know probably his most important work: “The Bottom Billion: 
Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It”. I can ensure you 
that he has written dozens and dozens of articles that you should read as well. They are 
brilliant. His book that was published in 2007 is really a bestseller not only on 
development research but also on global development and the global economy as such. 
Paul, thank you very much for agreeing to come. This is a very good start.” 
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Hans Singer – the gentle giant 
Prof. Sir Richard Jolly 
Hans Singer was a gentle giant. His intellectual leadership and extraordinary energy issued 
from a small man, of modest appearance and mild-mannered stance, head often cocked to 
one side, bushy eyebrows with a friendly but questioning smile. He was loved and 
deservedly feted for his visionary and creative thinking, bold, innovative and positive in 
contrast to his gracious and unassuming style and total disregard for outward appearances. 
When he was preparing to receive his knighthood from the Queen, he considered for 
several weeks whether he should wear his old suit or buy a new one. In the end, he bought 
a new one – from Marks and Spencer! 
In the UN he was widely known and admired for his outstanding professional qualities, his 
ready willingness to help and his scrupulous avoidance of gossip and infighting. The old 
guard of the UN remembered Hans as one who had maintained his integrity even while he 
was singled out for personal attack by Senator McCarthy (for his work on SUNFED, the 
proposed Special UN Fund for Economic Development). Indeed, because of these 
pressures on him, Hans Singer resigned from the UN in 1953 and was on the point of 
leaving when Dag Hammarskjöld, newly appointed as the Secretary-General, directly 
appealed to Singer to stay which, fortunately for the UN, he did. 
I was privileged to know Hans for over 42 years – from 1963, when, as a graduate student 
collecting data for my thesis, I shared a house with Hans for two months in Addis Ababa. 
In 2005, a week before his 95th birthday, I chaired his last lecture in IDS, when he spoke 
to some 60 or 70 graduate students.  
Professor Paul Collier will no doubt say more Hans Singer’s intellectual contributions. I 
want to underline four points about Hans the person.  
In 1936, when he had just obtained his doctorate and been part of the outer circle round 
John Maynard Keynes in Cambridge, Hans was asked to undertake the study of 
unemployment in Britain – which later was published as Men without Work. For this, 
Hans lived for some months with unemployed families in six towns of Britain, learning 
informally in the evening the human costs of unemployment. I wonder how many students 
would do this today, after they had studied under one of the most famous economists of 
the century?  
In 1947-1948, after Hans had started work on the terms of trade, he was asked by Maurice 
Pate, the Executive Director of UNICEF, to write a paper on Economic Development and 
Children. Hans Singer put aside his trade work for several months to write what became 
UNICEF’s first report on The Role of Children in Economic Development. Many times 
over his lifetime, Hans came back to issues of children – opportunities for improving 
nutrition in Kenya and Young Human Resources in Korea in the 1970s, the Impact of 
World Recession on Children in the 1980s. Hans gave advice when in UNICEF we 
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published Adjustment with a Human Face in 1987. It was typical for Hans to drop work on 
the conventional for what he considered more important – though unconventional.  
Thirdly, Hans was never one to pontificate on developing countries at a distance. Alec 
Cairncross, at one time the head of the UK’s Government Economic Service, commented 
as follows: “Hans’s life has been anything but cloistered. He has made frequent journeys 
half around the world. There are few of the developing countries that he has not visited 
and still fewer that he has not advised. He must have addressed a wider variety of 
academics in a wider variety of places about a wider range of subjects than any other 
economist, living or dead. He has moved from continent to continent, expounding, 
advocating, and devising strategies of economic development. His influence has been felt 
as much by word of mouth in the succession of countries where he has lectured as through 
the pile of working documents and published reports that survive like spoor from his 
travels.”  
Finally, as adviser or consultant, Hans’s strength was his willingness to listen and his total 
concentration on the problem and needs as felt by the agency or group he was advising. It 
was this which made him the economist of choice of so many parts of the UN – UNICEF, 
WFP, ECA, UNRISD, UNIDO, ILO and many others. My former colleagues in UNICEF 
always thought that Hans was special consultant to them – unaware that half a dozen other 
UN agencies were thinking the same.  
How does one assess the longer term impact of a person like Hans Singer? In the UN 
Intellectual History Project, we have identified four ways in which ideas and their 
originators have impact: 
• By influencing the ways that issues and situations are perceived; 
• By defining agendas for action; 
• By helping build alliances for change, which help mobilize NGOs and other groups 
to press for action; 
• By becoming embedded in some new or existing institution, which is given the 
mandate to carry forward the ideas into action. 
In all these ways, Hans Singer’s life as a development economist had real impact. But 
there is a fifth way, as John Shaw has made clear in his excellent biography2:  
• By inspiring the next generation to emulate his example.  
Hans Singer has provided more than enough stepping stones to help all of us along the 
path.  
                                                 
2 D. John Shaw, Sir Hans Singer: The Life and Work of a Development Economist (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan) 2002. 
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Hans Singer’s legacy: The problem of commodity exporters revisited 
Prof. Dr. Paul Collier 
Introduction 
It is an honour and a pleasure to give this lecture, the first in what will be an annual series 
of lectures on development. Hans Singer combined in high measure three roles that today 
are seldom found together. He was, of course, a researcher: it is his most celebrated 
research that will be the subject of my talk. But he was also deeply engaged in the world 
of policy. When Hans Singer studied for his doctorate this was indeed a combination to 
which many economists aspired: his supervisor, John Maynard Keynes, provided the 
perfect model. Like Keynes, Hans Singer focused his research on matters of urgent public 
policy, and wrote to address a wide audience. Today, much of that has been lost: academic 
economists write for each other and have manifestly become too detached from policy. 
But Singer’s third role should also be recognized: he built organizations, first at the United 
Nations and then at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS). Building organizations 
takes flair and persistence. In the academic world such characteristics are rare: academics 
tend to be drawn from that part of the population that is clever but incompetent and so few 
manage to leave a legacy beyond ideas. That combination – research, policy, and 
organization-building – was what makes Hans Singer a role model. In a more modest way 
I have tried to follow that same path. In addition to my academic work I have tried to 
engage with the world of policy. I wrote The Bottom Billion to help build a constituency of 
informed opinion among ordinary citizens who could then encourage our politicians to 
move our development policies beyond gestures. And I have tried to build organizations, 
both directing the research department of the World Bank where I was brought in by Joe 
Stiglitz, and through founding the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford, 
which twenty-three years later is the achievement of which I am most proud. 
The path of commodity prices 
But my lecture is going to be about research. Hans Singer’s most celebrated research 
result was the proposition that global commodity prices were in long term decline relative 
to the prices of other goods and services. He then inferred from this proposition that 
commodity exporters were going to be in deepening trouble unless they managed to 
diversify their economies. In particular, he was concerned that commodity exporters 
should industrialise. 
Non-economists will not appreciate how radical was the proposition that commodity 
prices were in decline. It was radical because orthodox economic theory had deduced 
precisely the opposite proposition, known as the Hotelling Rule. On this theory global 
commodity prices would rise relative to the prices of other goods at the world real interest 
rate. The underlying theoretical intuition is not complicated. Since commodities left in the 
ground are assets, they will only be left there if the expected return on them is the same as 
on other assets, namely the world interest rate. As long as expectations of returns are not 
systematically wrong, then this will indeed be the path that commodity prices follow.  
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So, who was right, Singer or Hotelling? Singer’s research was conducted in 1949: we now 
have the benefit of an additional 60 years of commodity prices. Taking the full sweep of 
prices over the last century, the consensus is now that Singer looks to have been right 
about commodity prices with the one exception being oil. So, why was Singer right, or, 
restated, why is the Hotelling Rule wrong? 
I think that there are four limitations with the Hotelling Rule that between them make it 
inapplicable. First, it ignores extraction costs. Suppose that copper companies expect the 
world price of copper to decline rather than to rise. According to Hotelling, they should at 
once take all the copper out of the ground and cash it in for bank deposits. But of course, 
significantly to accelerate the rate of extraction of copper would be very costly and so the 
degree of asset substitution between commodities and financial assets is limited. Second, 
commodities left in the ground are highly illiquid: the typical low-income country cannot 
borrow now on the collateral of a mineral to be extracted only some decades in the future. 
Yet low-income countries need revenues now and so their extraction plans cannot be set 
according to the expected long term path of prices. Thirdly, as we have experienced over 
the past year, whatever the long term path of commodity prices the short term path is 
extraordinarily volatile. This creates such radical uncertainty as to what future prices will 
be that any view of the trend must be heavily discounted in calculations of returns. The 
only certainty on which production decisions can be based is the current price. Finally, the 
future price will be dominated by developments in technology. This was Hans Singer’s 
core concern: technical progress in production would, he argued, drive prices down in the 
highly competitive markets for undifferentiated commodities but would be captured by 
firms and workers in the markets for the differentiated products that characterised goods 
and services. To this, I think, should be added technical progress in consumption. Over 
time output needs less and less inputs of basic commodities. Indeed, far from running out 
of them, which is a periodic panic story in newspapers, commodities which were at one 
time valuable have tended to become obsolete. In the nineteenth century nitrates were 
hugely valuable because they were the essential input for explosives. Technical ‘progress’ 
in military destruction has drastically reduced the value of nitrates. I expect that the same 
will happen to oil: by 2050 to avoid global warming we will have switched to non-carbon 
sources of energy and oil will no longer be valuable. After all, the reason that the world 
moved on from the Stone Age was not because we ran out of stone. So, I expect that even 
oil, the one commodity that to date has not followed the Singer hypothesis, will fall into 
line. 
The resource curse and its causes 
Singer was right about the declining long term trend in commodity prices, and about the 
need for commodity exporters to diversify. But even he underestimated the problems that 
commodity exporting countries face. Even high commodity prices have turned out to be a 
two-edged sword for exporters. Together with Benedikt Goderis I have researched the 
effect of commodity prices on the subsequent economic performance of exporting 
countries (Collier and Goderis, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Based on 40 years of global 
data we try to simulate the short and long term effects of the recent commodity booms. I 
should emphasise that we are not trying to forecast commodity prices: rather, we pose the 
question suppose that prices had remained at their boom levels what would this have done 
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for the growth of exporting economies? We find that in the short term commodity booms 
always produce growth. But in the longer term of two decades, on average they end up 
reducing rather than increasing national output. In other words, the ‘resource curse’ is 
unfortunately a reality. However, while this is the average, it conceals a wide diversity of 
performance. The resource curse is not inevitable: Botswana harnessed diamonds to 
transform its economy from an impoverished backwater to the fastest-growing economy in 
the world. Malaysia harnessed its natural resources to finance the social and economic 
infrastructure for the electronics export zone of Penang, transforming an impoverished 
region into a global powerhouse. We find that what separates the successes from the 
failures is governance: a topic that Hans Singer turned to in the last decade of his life. 
Above a threshold of governance countries harness commodity revenues for long term 
development, while below it they go from boom to bust.  
Why is governance so important for commodity exporters and what typically goes wrong? 
The exploitation of commodity extraction for the benefit of society fundamentally depends 
upon government. Whereas in other areas of economic activity government may or may 
not be critical, in commodity extraction it necessarily has a central role: the ‘minimal 
government’ model, fashionable in the 1980s, is completely inappropriate in a resource-
rich country.  
The first step that has typically gone wrong in resource-rich, low-income countries has 
been the discovery process. Anke Hoeffler and I have used global data on the value of 
known natural sub-soil assets to compare the OECD – rich countries – with Africa. As of 
2000, the typical square kilometre of the OECD had $125,000 of known sub-soil assets 
waiting to be exploited. In contrast, the average square kilometre of Africa had only 
$25,000 of known sub-soil assets. Most likely, this reflects a massive failure in the 
discovery process in Africa: the scope for resource extraction may be five times what it 
currently appears to be. The discovery process is highly dependent upon governance: 
investors have to be confident that if they make the irreversible investment in a mine, that 
property rights will be secure. Governments have an incentive to renege on agreements 
once investments have been made: a problem, economists refer to as ‘time inconsistency’. 
Because resource extraction is much more dependent upon fixed and irreversible 
investment than other forms of economic activity, the problem is particularly acute. 
The next problem of governance in the management of natural resource extraction is 
taxation. Typically in the past, secret deals have been negotiated between companies and 
ministers. Such deals are good for companies and all too often good for ministers, but not 
for the country. Companies have a double advantage over societies: they better understand 
the true value of the resource, and they have more control over their negotiating team than 
citizens have over ministers. A better approach that secret deals is a transparent auction in 
which rival companies are forced to reveal true value by the pressure of competition. Tax 
systems should also be robust to changing circumstances. In particular, they should 
anticipate that world prices of commodities will fluctuate so that when prices are high tax 
rates should be higher than when prices are low. Currently, tax rates are often not designed 
for these contingencies so that there are painful and slow renegotiations in the wake of 
price changes. For example, the Zambian government initially negotiated a deal for copper 
mining when the world copper price was low. Instead of the tax rate being contingent on 
the price companies were given long tax holidays. During the copper boom of 2006-2008 
  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 12 
these companies made huge profits which were tax free. But by the time the government 
had renegotiated, the copper price had collapsed. 
So far I have considered what might be thought of as the ‘upstream’ governance problems 
of harnessing natural assets for development: discovery and taxation. Now for the 
‘downstream’ problem of governance that concern the use of these revenues.  
First and foremost, the use needs to be distinctive because natural resource revenues are 
not sustainable. Most fundamentally, as natural assets are extracted they are depleted and 
so much of the revenues should be used for the accumulation of replacement assets. Hans 
Singer’s point that prices are in long term decline reinforces the unsustainable nature of 
resource rents. Hence, a resource-rich country should have a much higher savings rate 
than a resource-scarce country. To date, the opposite has usually been the case: resource-
scarce East Asia has saved well over 30 percent of GDP, whereas resource-abundant 
Africa has saved less than 20 percent. Resource-rich Africa needs a quantum leap in its 
savings rate. 
Depletion is one distinctive feature of resource riches; the other is volatility of revenues. 
As the past year has demonstrated, revenues are subject to massive and unpredictable 
fluctuations. This provides a further reason for saving: during booms savings should be 
particularly high so that busts can be cushioned. Here there is evidence of social learning. 
The commodity booms of the 1970s were often disastrously mis-managed: far from 
saving, governments often borrowed to gear-up the boom: for example, Nigeria borrowed 
heavily, and then had to repay once oil prices crashed in 1986, greatly amplifying the 
shock from the fall in oil prices. During the recent commodity booms most governments 
saved rather than borrowed: Nigeria accumulated around $70bn of reserves. 
Finally, what should savings be used for? There is considerable concern about Dutch 
Disease in resource-rich countries: the tendency for commodity exports to make other 
export activities uncompetitive. One model that some low-income countries have sought 
to emulate to avoid Dutch Disease is Norway, which has built up a sovereign wealth fund 
in foreign financial assets. This may be appropriate for Norway, but it is unlikely to be so 
for a low-income country. Norway is already very capital-abundant and so does the return 
on further investment within Norway is probably low. In contrast, low-income countries 
are extremely capital-scarce and so need to invest within their own economies. Investing 
in the country as opposed to saving abroad need not generate Dutch Disease. On the 
contrary, if investment is well-chosen it can facilitate rather than handicap diversification 
into other exports. For example, the investment can be targeted to the infrastructure that 
other export activities need, as the government of Malaysia did with the export zone at 
Penang.  
However, one reason low-income countries are capital-scarce is that the process of 
investment is often inefficient. The first and critical step in raising the investment rate is a 
phase of ‘investing-in-investing’. That is, accumulating the capacity to implement large 
investment programmes efficiently. This involves both building civil service capacity to 
design and manage public investment and helping the private sector to raise its investment 
rate. For example, the construction sector is likely to be an investment bottleneck because 
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it produces those capital goods – structures – that cannot be imported. The government of 
Botswana, which managed investment well, drew up an annual plan for the construction 
sector, identifying problems that might prevent local firms from implementing projects 
and then addressing them. This is an example of ‘investing-in-investing’, but 
unfortunately, to date Botswana has been exceptional.  
To summarise where we have got to, resource-rich countries face the challenge that living 
off commodity exports is ultimately unsustainable. But they also have an opportunity. The 
revenues from commodity exports could provide the finance for transformative 
development, enabling resource-exporting, low-income countries to become diversified, 
middle-income economies. Over the past half-century the impediment to this 
transformation has been mis-governance: harnessing natural assets for sustained 
development requires that a whole chain of decisions go right and usually one or more of 
them goes wrong. 
Democracy to the rescue? 
Until the recent commodity booms, the major opportunity for development for resource 
exporters was the pulse of income from the commodity booms of the 1970s. One possible 
explanation for mis-governance during those booms is that in almost all resource-rich low-
income countries governments were autocratic. During the 1990s this changed: 
democracy, or at least elections, spread across the low-income world. Possibly this has 
improved governance sufficiently for natural assets to be better managed. This is a 
researchable proposition and, together with Anke Hoeffler, I have recently investigated it 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2009). We find that natural resource revenues and democracy is not 
a successful cocktail. In the absence of natural resource revenues democracies outperform 
autocracies on the criterion of economic growth, but above a critical level of natural 
resources this is reversed. Far from democracy disciplining governments to manage 
resources better, resource revenues appear to corrupt democracy. The results are not 
entirely bleak: we find that the damage from democracy comes from electoral competition 
and that with sufficiently strong checks and balances the net effect of democracy is 
positive. But the form of democracy that spread during the 1990s was lop-sided: elections 
without checks and balances. Elections can be promoted anywhere, whereas checks and 
balances take time to build. So, to date, we cannot rely upon democracy to provide the 
sophisticated economic governance that is needed to harness natural assets for 
transformation. 
So what can be done? 
So, what is to be done? I will close with two initiatives with which I have been associated: 
an attempt by an academic economist to influence the world of policy. 
The first concerns the need for diversification into industry. The task of breaking into 
modern industry is now harder for a low-income country than it was thirty years ago when 
China led the way. The reason is that the late-comers to industrialisation now have to 
  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 14 
compete with China, which while still having low wages has built up hugely competitive 
clusters of exporting firms. For example, one city in China now produces two-thirds of the 
world’s buttons. Button firms congregate together because by doing so their costs are 
reduced. To give a couple of example, buyers go to the city because there is so much 
choice and so marketing costs are lower, and specialist equipment repair is available so 
that the downtime from broken machines is reduced. Now imagine yourself to be the first 
button-making firm in Ghana or Kenya. Even if your government provides the same 
infrastructure as China, and your workers work for the same wages, you will go bankrupt: 
you are the first firm and so, lacking a supporting cluster, your costs are higher than in 
China. We in the rich countries can help countries such as Ghana and Kenya to break in by 
intelligent use of our trade policies. What the late-comers to industrialisation need is 
protection, but in our markets not their own. Their own markets are largely irrelevant for 
modern global manufacturing: the Kenyan market for buttons is not sufficient to build a 
button cluster. What they need it temporary privileged access to our markets: privileged, 
that is, relative to China and other established producers. In case this sounds politically 
impossible, I should add that since 2001 both the USA and Europe have been doing it. The 
USA has been doing effectively, though the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
and Europe has been doing it ineffectively through Everything but Arms (EBA). Over this 
period African exports of garments to America have increased sevenfold, whereas they 
have declined absolutely to Europe. The devil with all trade deals is in the detail. AGOA is 
far from perfect, but crucially it has generous ‘rules of origin’ so that an African firm can 
qualify without having to perform every stage of the production process of a garment. 
EBA set the rules of origin more strictly, effectively killing the possibility of producing 
garments competitively in Africa for export to Europe. Now Europe has a second chance 
to get things right through the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements. There are 
some indications that rules of origin will be more generous. Of course, privileged market 
access is not enough to pump prime the late-comers into industrialisation. But it would 
complement the efforts of governments. Each effort is made more worthwhile if supported 
by the other. This mutually supportive agenda is the subject of the latest UNIDO 
Industrial Development Report, which I co-authored (UNIDO 2009). 
The second initiative aims to help the citizens of resource-rich, low-income countries to 
get up to speed in the sometimes complicated chain of decisions that need to go right in 
order for natural assets to be an opportunity instead of a curse. Getting these decisions 
right cannot just depend upon a single good finance minister: the range of decisions spans 
the whole of government, and the time period over which they must be taken and 
implemented is a generation. There is no substitute for an informed society that can hold 
government to account again and again. I wrote The Bottom Billion because I believe that 
even in our own high-income societies there is a need for a more informed citizenry on 
development issues. But in resource-rich countries the need is far more acute. In The 
Bottom Billion I proposed that the international community should draw up a Natural 
Resource Charter that spelt out the chain of decisions in terms that were readily accessible. 
Such a Charter could complement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which 
was launched by the international community in 2003 to encourage integrity in resource 
revenues. Integrity was the right place to start, but given the complexity of the economic 
decision chain it would be the wrong place to stop. And then I realised that it was no 
longer necessary to wait for international public organizations to do something: thanks to 
the internet ordinary people could do it ourselves. A group of academic economists, 
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lawyers and political scientists formed, including Michael Spence a Nobel Laureate, 
started to draw up a set of principles, which we called ‘Precepts’. To explain the Precepts 
we drafted a citizen’s guide and a practitioner manual, and started consulting stakeholders, 
revising in the light of their comments. In May the Charter was launched at a conference 
in Oslo, and in Dakar at the Annual Meetings of the African Development Bank. You can 
visit the website and comment on it at naturalresourcecharter.org. The Natural Resource 
Charter has no legal status: it is simply an attempt to help resource-rich societies make 
better use of their natural assets. You can help by spreading the word. 
Conclusion: Hans Singer’s legacy 
So finally, I return to Hans Singer’s legacy. I hope that in this lecture I have built upon the 
tradition into which Keynes inducted him as a student and which came to define his life: 
that of the engaged researcher. More specifically, I think that he would have approved 
these two initiatives both in substance and in spirit. As to substance, the acute economic 
management problems facing resource-rich countries if they were build sustainable 
development, and the difficulties of later-comer industrialisation, were both key aspects of 
his work. As to spirit, the approach of reaching beyond an audience of fellow academics to 
build informed societies was surely dear to his heart. 
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Revitalizing the United Nations: Five proposals3 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h c. mult. Sir Hans W. Singer 
1 Relations between the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN 
This question is specifically referred to in the General Assembly resolution requesting the 
Secretary-General to submit his report on an Agenda for Development and also in the draft 
report itself. It clearly has important institutional implications and is likely to be an 
important area of discussion during the coming years. 
Legally the IMF and World Bank are specialized agencies of the UN and their Terms of 
Agreement provide for guidance by the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. However 
this has clearly become realistic. The current practice of distinguishing a 'Bretton Woods 
system' from the UN System, although legally incorrect, reflects reality. The main reason 
why the financially powerful countries have shifted their support to the Bretton Woods 
(BW) System, and why their support for the UN system has eroded, lies in the different 
voting methods governing the two Systems. The Bretton Woods system is essentially 
based on the principle of one dollar one vote – voting proportionate to financial support – 
whereas the UN system is based on one country one vote. This gives the financially 
powerful countries control of the Bretton Woods institutions which they therefore consider 
as 'their own'. The UN system, after the first few years, now has a built-in majority of 
developing countries. 
The preference for the BW system is rationalized on the grounds that these institutions are 
more effective and have recruited more skilled and competent staff. But, to the extent that 
this is true, it may be taken as a consequence of lack of support and lack of resources for 
the UN system. This creates a vicious circle: Alleged lack of competence leads to 
withholding of resources which in turn makes it more difficult to recruit and keep 
competent staff or undertake effective action which will then be taken as a reason – or 
pretext – to withhold resources. By Contrast, the BW System can be said to benefit from a 
benevolent circle.  
We must assume that the unequal distribution of support and resources between the two 
systems will continue as long as this difference in voting systems persists. It is therefore 
suggested that thought be given to ways of moving the two voting Systems closer 
together, i.e. moving the BW voting system in the direction of the UN system, while 
moving the UN system in the direction of the BW system. It is realized that the UN 
system of one country one vote is embodied in the UN Charter and greatly treasured by 
the developing countries. But what is suggested here is not a unilateral abandonment of 
this voting system but a package: what the developing countries lose in the UN they would 
gain in the BW institutions. But the main point is that a rapprochement of the two voting 
                                                 
3 “Revitalizing the United Nations: five proposals” was originally published in 1995 in the special 
edition of “ids bulletin” “Fifty years on: The UN and economic and social development”, Vol. 26, No. 
4, October 1995. Reprint by generous permission of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 
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Systems would induce the financially powerful countries to distribute their support and 
resources more evenly. 
It is often claimed that the UN voting system is 'more democratic' man the BW system, 
but this is not entirely clear. The system of one country one vote gives equal voting 
powers to very large countries and to tiny countries, and thus discriminates against people 
in the larger countries. The UN Charter begins with the words: 'We the peoples...', not 'We 
the countries' or 'We the governments...' 
There are some precedents for voting Systems which represent a compromise or 
combination of the UN and BW Systems. One example is in the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF); another example is the proposed voting system in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In both these cases, the essential feature is a requirement that a 
majority both of member countries and of financial contributions is required. While this 
carries a danger of more frequent stalemates, it emphasizes the need for compromise 
between North and South and should give all concerned confidence that their interests are 
safeguarded. 
It may seem Utopian to propose such a far-reaching change involving changes in the 
Charter and Terms of Agreements of the various institutions. However, the Suggestion is 
put forward here in the belief that without a change in the direction here proposed the 
present unsatisfactory distribution of support and the erosion of UN support is likely to 
continue. 
Meanwhile, a number of smaller and readily implementable suggestions can be made to 
mitigate the erosion of the Status of the UN in relation to the BW institutions. It is dearly 
an anomaly that while the President of the World Bank and Managing Director of the IMF 
address the ECOSOC there is no reciprocity: the Secretary-General is not represented at 
the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF and does not bring the views of the UN 
to the attention of the Directors of the Bank and Fund. There is no reason why the 
Secretary-General or President of ECOSOC should not be the voice of the UN heard at the 
annual meetings of the Bank and Fund and why in the documentation for these meetings 
the UN should not bring relevant decisions of the General Assembly and ECOSOC to the 
attention of the Directors. Moreover, the Bank and Fund might well be requested to 
submit an annual report to the General Assembly and ECOSOC to explain what attention 
they have paid to the resolutions of the General Assembly and ECOSOC, in accordance 
with their Terms of Agreement. The present Speeches by the President and Managing 
Director to ECOSOC do not fulfil this function -they are more in the nature of expressing 
their views about the current Situation and action required. There is no reason why they 
should not continue to have this opportunity, but it is suggested that the UN should have 
the same opportunity at the annual meetings of the Bank and Fund. 
What is said above about the Bank and Fund would equally apply in future to the World 
Trade Organization. 
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2 A new integration of peace and development 
The old dichotomy of emergency (largely connected with conflict today) and development 
becomes more and more questionable. The roots of conflict are not only military and 
political (within the man-date of the Security Council), but also (and more fundamentally) 
economic and social. This raises questions of preventive action (already touched upon in 
Agenda for Peace) and of the proposal to create an Economic Security Council contained 
in the 1994 issue of the UNDP Human Development Report and possible alternatives. 
The proposal for an Economic Security Council would raise difficult questions, since it 
would create a new principal organ of the UN, it would require a change in the Charter, It 
would also raise questions of size and membership (although such questions might have to 
be faced anyway in connection with the present Security Council). Presumably there 
would be no veto in an Economic Security Council. Given the difficulties of creating an 
entirely new organ, perhaps priority should be given to considering alternatives. The 
simplest alternative would be to extend the mandate of the present Security Council to 
deal with 'threats to peace' also preventively and in the form of economic and social 
emergencies – before they erupt into actual military conflict. In fact this may not need a 
new mandate at all, but could be treated as a clarification of the present mandate – in that 
case it would not need any legal change at all. However it may be considered that such an 
extended mandate should not be subject to the present veto and non-military (not-yet 
military) threats to peace might be dealt with by a separate committee of the Security 
Council - a parallel to the present Military Committee. 
The other alternative – also discussed in the Human Development Report 1994 – would 
be to strengthen the capacity of ECOSOC to deal with such non-military threats to peace. 
For this purpose a special new high-level segment of ECOSOC could be created, with 
smaller membership than the present ECOSOC, and meeting in continuous session with 
periodic high-level meetings. 
Whatever solution is adopted there is now a consensus that there is a gap to be filled. 
Agenda for Peace has drawn attention to the opportunities and need for preventive action 
in the case of tensions (often triggered by economic and social emergencies) which can be 
foreseen to carry acute dangers of military conflict. There is also a present gap in dealing 
with the other end of the development/emergency continuum. The question of recon-
struction and rehabilitation after conflict should also be tackled by an Economic Security 
Council or whatever alternative is preferred. This may involve new relations with the 
Bretton Woods institutions, especially the World Bank. As indicated by its official title – 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – the World Bank was expected 
to be strongly involved in post-war reconstruction. In the event, this function did not 
develop, largely as a result of being overtaken by the Marshall Plan, and then withered 
away as a result or preoccupation of the World Bank first with specific development 
projects and later with structural adjustment programmes and debt collection. Perhaps the 
time has come to restore the reconstruction functions of the World Bank in close 
collaboration with whatever UN mechanism carries out the functions proposed for the 
Economic Security Council. 
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A special concern of the Economic Security Council (or its alternatives) should be the 
question of food security. The abolition of the World Food Council has created a gap and 
the problem is further accentuated by the GATT Agreement and the creation of the WTO. 
By general consensus, this will lead to a rise in international food prices and a reduction in 
food surpluses. Thus the need for food aid or other forms of providing food security for 
poor food-importing countries, especially in Africa, will in-crease, while at the same time 
the cost to donors of giving food aid will increase and surpluses will diminish, thus 
reducing the willingness to give food aid. This creates a Situation calling for inter-national 
vigilance and action which should be the concern of the UN in collaboration with the new 
WTO. Among the actions required would be the activation and enlargement of the 
International Emergency Food Reserve, including the pre-positioning of food Stocks in 
danger Spots in advance of actual conflict. 
3 The need for global economic management 
In the original Bretton Woods proposals global economic management was assumed to be 
in the United Nations (General Assembly and ECOSOC), Although at the time of Bretton 
Woods the UN did not yet exist (being created a year later at San Francisco) its creation 
had already been announced and the broad outlines of its organization were under 
negotiation. This impending arrangement was also reflected in the Terms of Agreement of 
the actually and World Bank which made them specialized agencies of the UN and 
provided for guidance by the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The IMF was visualized, 
with much larger resources than actually materialized, as a powerful instrument of dealing 
with financial, monetary, and balance of payments disequilibria, with an overriding 
objective of full employment, and with many of the functions of a world central bank. The 
World Bank was established on a project basis and not visualized as being involved with 
macroeconomic policies or structural adjustment problems. 
In the event today, whatever macroeconomic global management exists has been moved 
out of the multilateral System altogether and is now in the hands of the G7. This cannot be 
acceptable as a satisfactory solution of the problem: the G7 represents little more than 10 
per cent of mankind and even with the possible future addition of Russia it would still 
only represent a small minority. Moreover it is clear that the G7 – quite apart from 
insufficient attention being paid to the implications of macroeconomic measures for the 
rest of mankind, especially the developing countries - has not even proved able to promote 
satisfactory coordination among the 7. There is now spreading acceptance of the fact that 
global economic management must be made more democratic and move back in some 
way and to some extent to the multilateral framework visualized at Bretton Woods and 
San Francisco. 
Simple measures have been proposed which would not directly involve the UN 
institutionally although they would be clearly welcome to the UN. The principal such 
measure is an enlargement of the G7 to make it more representative and effective, and to 
include such developing countries as Brazil (for Latin America), Nigeria (for Africa), 
India (for Asia), and Eastern Europe, perhaps on a rotating basis. The inclusion of Russia 
is already on the agenda. 
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There are however other proposals which would concern the UN more directly. One 
suggestion would be for the Secretary-General or his appointed representative to 
participate in the discussions of the G7, more or less as a spokesman for the majority of 
mankind now excluded and as a guardian of their interests. Another proposal is for the UN 
Secretariat to be involved in the preparation of documentation and agendas for the 
meetings of the G7, with a view to drawing attention to neglected areas, urgent problems, 
and particularly problems concerning the developing countries (such as the debt problem, 
deteriorating terms of trade, etc). Mr Sutherland, the then Director General of GATT, in a 
letter to the Financial Times (7 June 1994) has proposed that the new WTO, jointly with 
the World Bank and IMF, should 'evolve a single coherent Statement on issues of 
economic concern for the G7. It may be suggested that this would be a proper task for the 
UN (which need not exclude submissions by the IMF, World Bank or WTO, and should 
certainly involve consultation and collaboration with these institutions). The restoration of 
the objectives of growth and full employment, as well as the newly prominent objective of 
poverty reduction, should be the special task for the UN to keep in the forefront of the G7 
discussions. The Implementation of decisions at the recent Social Summit should be 
brought by the UN to the agenda of the G7 and firmly kept there. The creation of an 
Economic Security Council (or the alternatives suggested above) would in itself serve to 
bring global coordination back to the multilateral forum where it was intended to be, at 
least in the area at the cutting edge of development and emergency. 
4 Strengthening the resources of the UN 
As previously explained, the question of resources is closely intertwined with questions of 
political support and competence. In the case of the UN this intertwined complex threatens 
to take the form of a vicious circle. This circle could be broken by reviving political 
support from powerful countries, perhaps at the price of a change in the UN voting 
system. Another way of breaking (he vicious circle is by giving the UN independent 
resources which would enable it to tackle the problem for which it has responsibility more 
effectively and promptly (and perhaps in doing so then elicit further support and 
contributions, thus breaking the vicious circle). In this connection, the possibility of 
providing resources for the UN from some form of international taxation is now 
increasingly raised and is now firmly on the international agenda. 
Various forms of international taxation have been mooted. Perhaps a leading candidate for 
consideration is the proposal for a tax on international currency transactions. This has been 
supported most recently by the Nobel Laureate, James Tobin, in the Human 
Development Report 1994. Given the current huge volume of foreign exchange 
transactions, a very small tax rate would yield a large revenue – for example a tax of 0.05 
per cent would yield $150 billion a year. Such a tax rate would be too small to deter 
genuine trade or capital movements, but it would have the merit – in addition to providing 
resources for international purposes – to deter disruptive speculative movements and to re-
store greater autonomy both to national monetary policy makers and also to the IMF. This 
could be expected to result in greater weight being given to economic fundamentals and 
less to personal enrichment by functionless gambling. Other international taxes have been 
proposed including taxes on air travel exploitation of common resources such as the Arctic 
Seas, etc. A system of tradable permits for pollution would also lend itself well to help to 
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finance international purposes including the UN (although the basic purpose of such 
proposals is to provide funds to compensate victims of pollution). This last proposal of 
tradable permits has the advantage of applying market principles ('the polluter pays'), thus 
helping to 'get prices right' by internalizing the cost of pollution. Given the present support 
for market orientation in important quarters, this idea should have some appeal and 
deserves serious consideration. 
The idea of international taxation is by no means new. m his original memoranda in 
preparation for the Bretton Woods Conference, Keynes had pro-posed a tax on balance of 
trade or balance of payments surpluses, at the rate of l per cent a month. His idea was that 
this would be an inducement to surplus countries to increase their Imports thus helping in 
the achievement of the full employment objective. At the same time, the yield from this 
tax would provide resources for deficit countries enabling them to maintain their Imports, 
further contributing to full employment. At the time, this proposal vanished without a 
trace, but the present recurrence of unemployment, balance of payments disequilibria, and 
the need for finding resources for international purposes might serve to revive interest in 
this proposal. 
Even without such novel instruments, UN resources could of course be increased if 
member countries paid contributions more promptly, if international commitments such as 
the 0.7 per cent aid target, commitments as a result of the Rio Conference resolutions, 
contributions to the International Emergency Food Reserve, etc were more fully and more 
promptly discharged. This would require concerted action by the contributors since 
otherwise we would face a 'prisoners dilemma' Situation, with each country waiting for the 
others to contribute. 
There are also other latent international resources which could be activated and used for 
the benefit of international action, specifically of UN action. There is the power, unused 
since 1981, to issue Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) through the IMF. The Managing 
Director of the IMF is himself on record as advocating an issue of SDRs to the extent of 
$36 billion. If part of this issue could be reserved for international purposes, or 
alternatively if the richer member countries of the IMF could forego their quota of SDRs 
for the benefit of the UN or for other agreed international purposes, the problem of 
resources would be that much nearer to a solution. Similarly, there is latent international 
capital available in the gold reserves held by the IMF – the sale of some of these reserves 
is also increasingly suggested. Ultimately this comes back to the question of political will. 
Once the principle of International taxation or tapping of latent inter-national resources is 
accepted, the detailed forms of such taxation or mobilization should be amenable of 
international agreement. 
5 Specific roles for the UN 
The present role of the UN system in the narrower sense – excluding the Bretton Woods 
system – is now often defined as looking after the 'soft' parts of development: social 
factors, poverty reduction, employment, vulnerable groups, women, children, refugees, 
war victims, health, etc, while the Bretton Woods system would look after the 'hard' facts 
of development, i.e. money, finance, trade, as well as macroeconomic policies, dealing 
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with debt problems etc. Such a division of labour between 'hard' and 'soft areas is also 
mentioned in the Secretary-Generals Report on an Agenda for Development. There 
would be a great deal of scepticism among development professionals about such a 
division of development issues into 'hard' and 'soft issues. Moreover, the implication that 
the hard issues are more important and the real core of development and require greater 
competence to deal with is out of tune with more recent insights into the development 
process. These recent insights tend to place increasing emphasis on human capital and 
human resources – presumably in the soft area – as distinct from physical Investment and 
financial resources presumed to be in the hard area. From that point of view, the UN 
system could be quite satisfied with responsibility for the allegedly soft part of 
development, provided that both parts were taken equally seriously and equally supported 
with resources. That however is not the case. Insofar as the soft parts of development – 
poverty reduction, health, education, etc – are taken as seriously as they should be, they 
are then undertaken by the Bretton Woods institutions which command the necessary 
support and resources and are presumed to have competence derived from their experience 
of dealing with the hard parts of development. 
A good example is the field of technical assistance. Under the 'Kennedy Compromise' of 
around 1960, soft financial aid was allocated to the World Bank (IDA) while technical 
assistance and food aid were allocated to the UN (UNDP and WFP). The UNDP was 
supposed to be the chief funding agency and coordinating agency for technical assistance 
through-out the UN system. Yet today the World Bank gives as much or more technical 
assistance than the UNDP and the IMF is rapidly expanding its technical assistance 
operations without having to rely on funding from the UNDP. In an effort to restore the 
role of the UNDP, attention is now focused on enhancing the role of the UNDP resident 
representatives to that of UN coordinators or even UN ambassadors. Similarly, there is a 
parallel effort to place the technical assistance activities of UN agencies into a country-
programming framework, devised and negotiated by the UNDP. All such proposals may 
improve the efficiency and coherence of UN technical assistance and enhance the role of 
the UNDP, but they do not solve the problem of relationship with the Bretton Woods 
system. To give the UNDP or UN representative the enhanced role aimed at, the 
Suggestion may be made that the UN coordinator should take part in the discussion of 
stabilization and structural adjustment programmes; perhaps representatives of specialized 
agencies should also participate. Some of these programmes have a crucial impact say on 
agriculture and health, and presumably the field officers of the FAO and WHO have more 
concrete country knowledge and competence than Washington-based macro-economists. 
(Similarly on the governments' side, one would wish for these negotiations not to be 
limited to ministries of finance and central bank officials but to include representatives of 
the ministries of agriculture, health, etc – but that is a matter for governments rather than 
the UN system.) 
In pursuit of this greater coordination of technical assistance and operational programmes 
by the UN at the country level it has been proposed that all these programmes (UNDP, 
WFP, UNICEF, HCR, etc) should be merged into a single Institution. However, this 
proposal ought to be resisted. It could make matters worse by depriving UN operations 
even of some of the support which they now enjoy. Organizations like WFP, UNICEF, 
and others have established a clear identity of their own, their concrete purposes attract 
both political and financial support; they have backing in public opinion which in the long 
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run may influence governments of contributing countries. It would be counterproductive 
to throw all this away by a merger into one large omnibus institution without the 
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